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FOR  THE  PAST  ten years,  the economic  growth and industrialization of 
many  East  Asian  countries  has  been  impressive  by  any  measure  of 
performance. I The newly  industrializing  economies  (NIEs)  and China 
have  sustained  exceptionally  high  rates of  growth,  ranging from 6.1 
percent in Hong Kong to 10.2 percent in China. Equally impressive has 
been  the  extent  to  which  these  countries  have  been  able  to  pursue 
economic  integration  among  themselves,  while  also  deepening  their 
trade and financial relations  with  the rest of  the world.  Intraregional 
trade as a share of the region's  total trade jumped from 31.4  percent in 
1984 to 42.2  percent in  1994.  Under the auspices  of the Asia  Pacific 
Economic  Cooperation  (APEC),  these  countries  have committed  to a 
rather ambitious  schedule  of  trade liberalization  with the goal  of free 
trade in  the  region  by  2020,  without  forming  an economic  bloc.  A 
number of recent studies also suggest that financial flows between East 
Asian countries have risen markedly in recent years,  thereby allowing 
their financial markets to forge stronger intraregional linkages and grad- 
ually  to  become  integrated  into  the  markets  of  North  America  and 
Europe.2 
The  economic  growth  and integration  of  East  Asia  is  largely  the 
result of the sweeping  economic,  social,  and political changes that have 
taken place  over the past decade.  Two  developments  stand out as the 
main driving  forces.  The first is the widespread  acceptance  of  liberal 
economic  policies  that have accelerated the process of trade and finan- 
cial liberalization.  Notwithstanding their continuing trade disputes with 
Europe  and North  America,  most  of  the  East  Asian  countries  have 
managed to lower tariff rates and invisible  trade barriers substantially 
and to deregulate and open up domestic  capital markets. 
The opening of local financial markets has been instrumental in East 
1. East  Asia here  refers  to China  and  Japan;  Taiwan, South  Korea,  Hong Kong, and 
Singapore  (newly industrializing  economies);  Brunei  Darussalam,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
the Philippines,  Thailand,  and Vietnam  (the rest of the Association  of South  East Asian 
Nations, other  than  Singapore);  and Myanmar,  Laos, and Cambodia. 
2.  See, for example, Yung Chul Park  (1996). 
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Asia's  economic  expansion because it has increased the region's  access 
to international financial markets and, in many countries,  subsequently 
induced large capital  inflows.  The liberalization  of  trade in services, 
financial  services  in particular,  has  also  contributed to keeping  East 
Asia  open.  Since  the  service  sector  remains underdeveloped  in most 
countries  in the region  (except  for Singapore  and Hong Kong),  these 
countries have increasingly  had to rely on North America and Europe 
for financial and other services.  In fact,  the ongoing  liberalization  of 
trade in services has strengthened the complementarity in trade between 
East Asia,  on the one  hand,  and Europe  and North America,  on the 
other, because the East Asian countries enjoy a comparative advantage 
in exporting a large volume of manufactures, whereas Europe and North 
America have a high degree of competitiveness  in service  trade.3 As a 
result,  the creation of  a regional  economic  bloc-whether  a yen bloc 
or a regional bloc led by Japan or any other country-in  East Asia has 
become  both less  realistic  and less  desirable. 
The second major development  is China's entry into the world trad- 
ing system.  Since  embarking on market-oriented economic  reforms in 
the  late  1970s,  including  the  lifting  of  trade restrictions,  China  has 
transformed itself from a virtually closed economy  into the tenth largest 
trading nation in the world.  Because  of the apparent complementarity 
in trade, two-way  trade between members of the Association  of South- 
east Asian Nations (ASEAN)  and the NIEs, on the one hand, and China, 
on the other,  has continued  to  soar,  and its expansion  has helped  to 
propel the economic  boom and regional integration in East Asia. 
In recent years,  however,  there has been increasing indication,  and 
hence concern,  that unless there are concerted efforts at policy  coordi- 
nation and cooperation between East Asia, Europe, and North America, 
these  two  developments  could  very well  blunt East Asia's  dynamism 
and possibly  could even derail the continued economic  liberalization of 
the region. 
Financial market opening,  which has promoted the investment boom, 
has made several East Asian countries highly vulnerable to speculative 
currency attacks and now threatens some of them with financial crisis. 
China's  emergence  as  a  major trading nation  could  destabilize  and 
3.  According to Findlay (1995), most East Asian countries are net importers  of 
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disrupt the region's  trading system  as well  as its trade relations  with 
Europe and North America.  Below,  I analyze the problems concerning 
financial liberalization  in East Asia  and China's  growing  presence  in 
the world trading system,  suggesting  courses of action that could avert 
the creation of financial bubbles in the region and ease China's passage 
to a full role in the world trading system. 
Investment Booms and Speculative  Bubbles  in East Asia 
During the period 1990-94,  large volumes  of foreign capital surged 
into those East Asian developing  countries that were pursuing deregu- 
lation and opening  their money  and capital markets. According  to the 
International Monetary Fund, the East Asian  countries  (excluding  Ja- 
pan) experienced  a net inflow  of  $261  billion,  more than twice  their 
total inflow during the whole  decade of the  1980s.4 Indeed,  the inflow 
during  1990-94  amounted to  50  percent of  total capital  inflows  into 
developing  countries worldwide  during this period.  Moreover,  24 per- 
cent of  these  flows  were  in the form of portfolio  investment,  a much 
greater proportion than the 8 percent of the period 1983-89.  Net foreign 
portfolio investment increased from $10 billion during 1983-89  to $63 
billion  during  1990-94,  although  foreign  direct  investment  has  re- 
mained the most important source of external financing in these coun- 
tries. Net inflows of foreign direct investment increased markedly, from 
$36 billion during 1983-89  to $117 billion during 1990-94,  when they 
accounted for 45 percent of total net inflow. 
Much of this foreign capital has been brought in to augment domestic 
investment  in the East Asian countries,  unlike the experience  in Latin 
America,  where to a large degree foreign  capital was consumed.5 As- 
suming that the rate of return to capital remains relatively  stable,  any 
increase in the ratio of investment to GDP will push up the growth rate 
of  GDP.  This,  indeed,  seems  to be happening in East Asia.  Because 
investment as a percentage of GDP exhibited  a rising trend during the 
period of  capital  inflow  in the East Asian  countries,  it would  appear 
that the region's  economic  growth is closely  correlated with the volume 
of capital inflow. 
During the period  1990-95,  investment  as a proportion of GDP in 
4.  All numbers  in this paragraph  are from International  Monetary  Fund  (1995). 
5.  See Calvo, Leiderman,  and Reinhart  (1994). 360  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
all of these countries was significantly  higher than it had been in 1980, 
but saving  rates were relatively  stable,  resulting  in large increases  in 
the current account deficit.  In four of the most rapidly growing  econ- 
omies  (Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  and South Korea),  the current 
account deficits  as a share of GDP ranged from 2 percent in Korea to 
almost  10 percent in Malaysia.  Most of the members of ASEAN  have 
been financing increasingly large shares of their current account deficits 
by borrowing from international financial markets in the form of port- 
folio  investment.  Such capital could be withdrawn from the host coun- 
tries at any time,  without warning.  This  situation has naturally raised 
the questions  of whether the members of ASEAN  and South Korea can 
sustain their current account deficits  and whether they  are immune to 
financial crises  like those that have plagued the Latin American econ- 
omies.  According  to  a recent  feature  story  in  the  Economist,  some 
foreign investors are now nervously  asking themselves  if further finan- 
cial meltdowns,  such as befell  Mexico,  could be in the making,  while 
others have concluded  that, at the least,  the miracle years are over.6 
Paul Krugman has recently suggested that speculative  bubbles could 
develop  in East Asian financial markets because,  sooner or later, inves- 
tors will come to realize that they have been overly optimistic  about the 
prospects  of  these  economies.7  In consequence,  they  might  suddenly 
withdraw from East Asian markets en masse,  thereby provoking major 
crises  comparable  to  that in  Mexico.  The  main  source  of  their  new 
pessimism  would be the belief  that East Asian growth,  based on large 
increases  in capital and labor inputs rather than improvements  in effi- 
ciency,  will  come  to an end. 
By contrast, I argue that the current account problems now plaguing 
some of the East Asian countries have been caused, in part, by a massive 
influx  of  foreign  capital  that was  both  speculative  and short-term in 
nature. Since  financial markets are susceptible  to destabilizing  specu- 
lation by poorly  informed  investors,  some  controls  may be necessary 
to discourage  speculative  capital movements,  and these  should be co- 
ordinated  internationally  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  global  financial 
liberalization.  Further, I argue that East Asia's  so-called  miracle years 
are not over. 
6.  "Emerging  Asia's Sombre  Era," Economist,  August 24, 1996, pp. 55-56. 
7.  See Krugman  (1995) and "The Myth  of Asia's Miracle" in Krugman  (1996). Yung  Chul Park  361 
Even  before  capital market transactions were deregulated and ever 
increasing volumes of foreign capital began to flow into East Asia,  most 
of these countries were already growing  at higher rates than any others 
in the  world.  In fact,  it  is  this  success,  and the potential  for future 
success,  that has attracted foreign capital into the region.  Not only has 
there been  both rapid growth and domestic  stability,  but the rates of 
return to capital,  adjusted for credit and market risks,  have been rela- 
tively  high  in East Asia.8  In most  East Asian  countries,  the national 
budgets are balanced or are generating surpluses.  Moreover,  their pol- 
icymakers have maintained the stability of nominal exchange  rates rel- 
ative  to the U.S.  dollar,  in order to stabilize  real exchange  rates and 
domestic prices.  Since the mid-1980s,  all of the countries in the region 
have pursued ambitious  policies  of  trade and financial  liberalization, 
and they continue to do so to this day. 
Given these sound economic  fundamentals and the region's  commit- 
ment to liberalization,  bond market dealers,  fund managers,  and other 
institutional investors have seen enormous opportunities to make money 
and have been purchasing East Asian assets  in large quantities.  Many 
East Asian  financial  markets have  become  emerging  markets,  where 
investors have sought to be the first to move in and also to be ready to 
get out first, if need be. To some,  this type of investment and economic 
expansion  looks  like a speculative  bubble in the making. 
When foreign investors see an opportunity to earn handsome returns, 
they will  rush into a local  financial market as a herd. As a result,  the 
volume of their aggregate lending can be excessive,  in that it is greater 
than the host country can absorb in the short run. Many of these foreign 
investors  are likely  to be noise  traders, however,  and will  not under- 
stand or care about the possible consequences  of their lending, but there 
is  no  mechanism  to  coordinate  their behavior.  Local  borrowers,  for 
their part, will  be encouraged  to borrow as much as they  can by the 
positive  interest rate differentials between local and international finan- 
cial markets. 
Little is known,  either in theory or empirically,  about the macroeco- 
nomic effects  of capital account deregulation in developing  economies 
where domestic  interest rates are higher than those prevailing  in inter- 
8.  Recent  estimates  using Korean  data, provided  by the Korea  Institute  of Finance, 
show that the rate of return  to capital in the manufacturing  sector could be as high as 
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national financial markets. The pattern of adjustment and time required 
to reach a new  equilibrium  after the liberalization  of  capital  account 
transactions differs from country to country, depending on the type of 
exchange rate regime and other economic characteristics.9 It is therefore 
difficult to estimate how much foreign capital will  flow in; how it will 
be  allocated  between  consumption  and investment  and also  between 
different investment projects; and how it will affect the exchange  rate, 
domestic  interest rates, and other macroeconomic  variables in the pro- 
cess  of liberalization. 
Since foreign capital has predominantly been used to finance invest- 
ment rather than consumption  in the East Asian countries,  the capital 
inflow might induce higher levels  of investment and generate pressure 
for currency appreciation.  If the inflow and the subsequent increase in 
investment  could be spread evenly  over time,  macroeconomic  disturb- 
ances  would  be  minimized.  However,  due  to  the  lightning  speed  at 
which  adjustment takes  place,  the  financial  markets do  not permit a 
gradual increase in either capital inflow or investment.  Instead, foreign 
capital floods in,  leading to an accumulation of foreign reserves and a 
large increase in investment that, in the short run, manifests  itself  as a 
deterioration of the current account. 
The increase in the current account deficit, in turn, alarms the foreign 
investors,  even though the deficit will help to expand export capacities 
in the long run. If, for whatever reasons,  foreign investors believe  that 
the deficit is unsustainable and that a currency devaluation is imminent, 
they  may  pull  out their investments  en  masse,  precipitating  a major 
financial crisis that could be contagious. 
Should monetary authorities allow nominal exchange  rates to appre- 
ciate when the volume of capital inflows appears to be excessive?  If an 
army of institutional investors swarms into a small East Asian economy, 
the exchange  rate cannot and should not bear the brunt of the necessary 
adjustment because  it is not clear,  either theoretically  or empirically, 
what effect  a large  currency  appreciation  would  have  in the  present 
situation. For example,  to slow down the inflow of capital, the exchange 
9.  A simulation  exercise tracing  the effects of capital  account  deregulation  in Korea 
shows that the surge in capital inflow can be destabilizing.  It slows down only after a 
protracted  adjustment  period  during  which the current  account  continues  to deteriorate; 
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rate would initially  have to appreciate sufficiently  to generate expecta- 
tions of a large subsequent depreciation. Few East Asian countries could 
accommodate  such a large swing  in exchange  rates. 
In the face of an onslaught of capital inflows,  policymakers  in East 
Asian countries have instead attempted to stabilize  the values  of their 
currencies by stabilizing nominal exchange rates against the U.S.  dollar 
through intervention in local foreign exchange markets. Since interven- 
tion  by  itself  leads  to an expansion  in the money  supply,  it is  often 
sterilized  by combining  it with open market sale of government  secu- 
rities  to  mop  up the excess  liquidity.  This,  in turn, forces  domestic 
interest rates up even further, inducing additional capital inflows. 
What about fiscal  tightening?  Should  East Asian  countries  further 
cut back their budgetary expenditures,  in particular, government con- 
sumption? The answer is definitely  no.  Such an increase  in domestic 
saving  likely  would  not replace  foreign  investment  because  it would 
make the economic  prospects  of  the East  Asian  countries  look  even 
more attractive and attract yet more foreign capital.  Traditional mone- 
tary and fiscal tightening  is unlikely  to be adequate to arrest the dete- 
rioration of the current account balance and may have to be supported 
by direct and indirect capital control measures.  However,  where such 
measures are not a viable  option,  it would be necessary  to establish  a 
multilateral mechanism for assisting  countries that face speculative  at- 
tacks,  as discussed  below. 
Are East Asia's  miracle years over? Will the region meet the same 
fate as did the Soviet  Union,  as Krugman argues because of surprising 
similarities that he finds between them?'0 The extensive  empirical study 
by  Susan  Collins  and Barry Bosworth  in  this  volume  suggests  that 
growth in East Asia can be sustained into the future if high investment 
rates can be maintained.  One could readily offer,  as another basis for 
optimism  about the region's  continued growth,  a number of examples 
in  which  improvements  in  efficiency  are not  captured by  measured 
increases  in total factor productivity.  What should  be emphasized  in 
the debate concerning East Asia's  prospects for growth is that, despite 
what Krugman calls the extraordinary growth in capital per worker, the 
rates of  return to  capital  in  the  region  are higher  than those  in  the 
10.  Krugman (1996). 364  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
advanced  industrial economies.  As  long  as that differential  remains, 
the volume of capital stock will continue to grow and, in a neoclassical 
growth framework, the rate of growth will  be higher. 
In recent years,  all of  the East Asian  NIEs  and the ASEAN  states 
have undertaken ambitious investments in a number of high-technology 
industries, such as aerospace, semiconductors,  personal communication 
systems,  and new materials, as well as expanding social infrastructure. 
This  investment,  in due course,  will  lead to overall  improvements  in 
economic  efficiency.  It  should  also  be  remembered  that there  are a 
number of less  developed  East Asian countries,  including  China,  that 
are waiting to get onto the launch pad of growth driven by increases in 
inputs.  As  these  countries  sustain  rapid growth  and their trade with 
other East Asian countries expands,  South Korea, Taiwan,  and Singa- 
pore will  realize  gains from the market expansion. 
Taken together,  the ongoing  liberalization  of capital account trans- 
actions,  the  growing  need  for  foreign  capital,  and expectations  for 
continued  growth will  likely  induce not less  but more flows of capital 
into the East Asian economies,  despite the recent balance of payments 
problems.  Any negative effects  of short-term speculative  capital flows, 
such as increasing  exchange  rate and interest rate volatility,  may best 
be offset  by maintaining the soundness  and dynamism of the domestic 
economy.  However,  during surges of inflow,  the governments of coun- 
tries that face speculative  attacks should, as the International Monetary 
Fund suggests,  consider  implementing  measures to influence  the vol- 
ume and characteristics of capital inflows,  such as taxes on short-term 
bank deposits  and other financial assets,  reserve requirements against 
foreign borrowing, prudential limits on banks' offshore borrowing, and 
limits on consumption loans." While it is not without its shortcomings, a 
currency  transaction  tax would certainly  be one of the most effective means 
of reducing  volatility in short-term  speculative  capital movements. 
However, there are dangers inherent in imposing such controls unilat- 
erally, as they will necessarily interfere with further global financial lib- 
eralization. Moreover, there exists no workable financial mechanism that 
would help to prevent a financial crisis in any one East Asian country 
from spilling over into the rest of the region. For these reasons, serious 
consideration should be given to multilateral  efforts to control speculative 
1 1.  International Monetary Fund (1995). Yung  Chul Park  365 
short-term  capital movements, rather  than leaving the problem to individ- 
ual countries. 
Dealing  with China's  Economic Ascendancy: 
A Policy  of Active Engagement 
China remains an enigma  about which  divergent  views  abound.  It 
has long  been the focus  of  discussion,  for it has recorded the fastest 
economic  growth of  any country for the past twenty  years and seems 
destined to become  the next global superpower. Many take a dim view 
of China's  economic  advancement because  they consider it a threat to 
stability  in  Asia;  others  predict  that the  country  will  break up  into 
warring regions or provinces  or will  experience  a political  upheaval or 
a  major slowdown  in  its  economic  development.'2  Others  are more 
optimistic.  Whatever direction China's  development  may take,  it will 
have a profound effect  on the world economy  and on that of the East 
Asian region,  in particular. It is therefore in the interest of the whole 
world,  and especially  of  East Asia,  for China to prosper and become 
more politically  liberal. 
To many East Asians,  China's size,  rich cultural diversity,  and com- 
plexity  are so overwhelming  that it hardly seems  a single country. The 
economic  and social  disparities within China, particularly between  in- 
land and coastal  areas, are enormous and growing.  Over the next dec- 
ade, at least two mainland cities,  Shenzhen and Guangzhou (in addition 
to Hong Kong),  will  attain a level  of economic  sophistication  to rival 
that of Singapore.  The three areas centering on Shanghai, Beijing,  and 
Tianjin will  challenge  the records of Taiwan and Korea in growth and 
industrial capabilities.  And a number of regions will come to resemble 
Korea in the 1960s  and 1970s.  However,  many other regions,  such as 
Guizhou,  Shaanxi,  and Gansu,  will  remain as poor as some  African 
countries are today. 
These economic  and social disparities will be the most serious cause 
of friction between regions,  as well  as between the central government 
and the local governments,  and they pose the greatest threat to China's 
unity. There are a number of indications that the relatively more affluelnt 
provinces  have gained  a greater measure of economic  autonomy over 
the past few years and that many provinces are trying to remain beyond 
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the direct control of the central government.  As the provinces  become 
more  autonomous,  movements  of  capital  and  labor are likely  to  be 
controlled  at the provincial  borders to an increasing  extent.  In the fu- 
ture, foreign  firms seeking  to invest  in China may well  have to nego- 
tiate  with  the  provincial  governments  rather than with  the  central 
government. 
At this stage in the ongoing  discussion,  almost anything can be said 
about China's  future, but the pessimists  would seem to outnumber the 
optimists.  The present comment reflects the latter camp.  I expect  that 
China will  be able to sustain rapid economic  growth and stability  for 
many more years; it will not become  balkanized and split into separate 
warring entities;  and it will  eventually  mature and become  a reliable 
member of the world trading community.  These observations are based 
on the assumption that China will be able to decentralize  its systems of 
government  and economic  management,  giving  more autonomy to the 
provincial  governments,  despite the communist  legacy. 
At first glance,  this optimistic  view of China might seem misplaced. 
There is,  indeed,  much cause for concern.  Unlike the East Asian NIEs, 
China must shed the shackles  of  some  fifty years of  communist  eco- 
nomic mismanagement and also deal with other unique problems. Given 
the widening economic  disparities and the social and political problems 
that they entail,  the communist regime must continue to announce five- 
year national economic  plans (even though they are seldom implemen- 
ted)  in order to  maintain its  legitimacy.  The gross  inefficiencies  and 
quasi-bankrupt status of  nearly  half  of  China's  tens  of  thousands  of 
state enterprises,  moreover,  will continue to burden the central author- 
ities.  Few  people  are confident  that the planned transfer of  property 
rights from the state to the private sector can be carried out smoothly. 
Such  problems  and dilemmas,  however,  seem  to  be  countered  by 
China's strengths. Most important, the country's leaders in Beijing have 
proved  pragmatic  in  managing  the  economy,  as  evidenced  by  their 
ability  and determination to carry out a host of  liberal reforms.  They 
are acutely  aware of the fact that economic  micromanagement  can no 
longer be effective.  In fact,  the Chinese  leaders would be satisfied  if 
they  were  able  to  maintain  a  single  national  currency  and a unified 
financial system,  in addition to a national tax administration. 
If Beijing  cedes  more autonomy to the regional  governments,  how 
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party-military  establishment  will  hold the country's  disparate regions 
together  through  its  network  of  information,  communications,  and 
transportation,  not to  mention  its  willingness  to  use  force  whenever 
necessary.  Although unstable, this dichotomy of economic  and political 
systems  will  be maintained for as long as nationalist sentiment is kin- 
dled and prevails throughout the country. 
In addition to using party and military machinery,  the central gov- 
ernment has so far attempted to hold the country together by rallying 
the people's  aspirations that China become  a major military power and 
remain the leader of  Asia,  in the face  of  what the leaders  in Beijing 
perceive  as American hegemony.  The fanning of nationalist flames will 
become  more  intense  over  time,  because  it is  yet  another means  by 
which the central government clings  to power. 
Similarities  between China and the other economic  "tigers"  in East 
Asia  also  support the view  that China's  economic  growth can be sus- 
tained for a long  time.  Part of the success  of the economic  tigers has 
been due to high saving rates; China's rate, at 40 percent, is the second 
highest in the world, after Singapore. In addition, China has a relatively 
small government sector that accounted for only  15 percent of GDP in 
1995.13  It has  also  demonstrated  its  ability  to  assimilate  technology 
from abroad, as well  as to develop  its own.  For a long time to come,  it 
will be able to exploit  the wage-cost  advantage and to benefit from the 
distribution network and capital of the overseas  Chinese population. 
Even  supposing  that such optimism  about China's  development  is 
not warranted and that the country will  be lucky to achieve just 3 or 4 
percent  annual growth  for the  next  ten  years,  it  will  still  be  a huge 
market for exporters  everywhere.  And even  if  the rate of  growth  of 
exports falls  from the current rate of almost 20 percent to only  7 or 8 
percent, China will  still become  the seventh or eighth largest exporter 
of manufactured goods  in the world within a decade. 
One  might  ask  why  East  Asia  is  so  concerned  about China.  One 
reason is that it is highly doubtful whether China will  open its markets 
to the same extent as other Asian countries or will  abide by the rules of 
fair trade, and there is no obvious  means by which  it could be forced 
to do so. China has agreed to APEC's schedule for trade liberalization, 
13. Admittedly,  this figure  does not include state enterprises,  but it is substantially 
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but since this is not binding, the East Asian countries (including Taiwan 
and South Korea) will likely  find themselves  inundated by inexpensive 
Chinese manufactured goods and may therefore experience  a slowdown 
in real wage growth, especially  for unskilled workers. This could mean 
an appreciable decline  in the standard of  living  of many East Asians, 
although there is,  as yet,  no empirical work supporting this hypothesis. 
Another cause of East Asia's  deep concern is China's forays into the 
markets of  the United  States  and the European Union.  China gained 
strong footholds  in these markets long ago and has since  been carving 
out ever  larger shares for itself,  mainly  at the expense  of  other East 
Asian countries.  As exports are one of the main engines  of growth in 
most East Asian  countries,  this will  likely  mean a slowdown  in their 
export growth  and therefore  a slowdown  in GNP growth,  which  will 
also  bring down the standard of  living.  Furthermore, China has been 
running a sizable  current account  deficit  with  many other East Asian 
countries,  which  has been  more than offset  by China's  bilateral trade 
surplus with the United States. However,  if the trend continues,  it could 
provoke a protectionist backlash in the United States against the entire 
East Asian region. 
Still  more concerns  arise from the fear that China will  not hesitate 
to use  its influence  and power to protect its interests.  China has been 
quick to play  its economic  rivals off  against each other to achieve  its 
own aims,  and its leaders have a penchant for using trade as a political 
weapon. 
These issues  are so pressing because East Asia will become  increas- 
ingly  dependent  on China as its economic  might grows.  The less  de- 
veloped countries in the region (such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos) can be expected to pursue export-oriented development  strat- 
egies  and  will  therefore  need  markets for  their  products.  They  are 
already looking  at the vast and growing  Chinese  market. These  coun- 
tries could eventually  fall under China's influence,  for their prospects, 
and indeed their survival,  will depend on access to the Chinese market, 
on  the  country's  internal  stability,  and on  its  nonbelligerent  foreign 
policy  stance.  The  countries  on China's  periphery could  very  easily 
come  to be known as the economic  area of  "greater China." 
What,  then,  can  the United  States  and the European Union  do  to 
minimize  the potential for economic  conflict  in the East Asian region? 
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there is no easy way to restrain it or retaliate against it when it deviates 
from the principles  of  fair trade. Indeed,  the United  States  has little 
leverage  against  China other than through the use  of  sanctions,  and 
even  this strategy has serious limitations.  In order for sanctions  to be 
effective,  they would have to be supported by the East Asian countries, 
but it would be unrealistic to expect these countries to fall in line behind 
such a policy,  given  China's growing  influence over them. 
In light of these problems,  it is incumbent on the United States and 
the European Union  to take serious  action to assist China's  entry into 
the world trading community and to ease the friction that its entry may 
cause.  To this end,  the United States and the European Union  should 
pursue a policy  of active economic  engagement-in  effect,  a policy  of 
containment that would protect the interests of all the parties involved. 
First and foremost,  the United States and the European Union should 
permit China to  accede  to the WTO if  it achieves  the conditions  for 
admission that are generally applied to developing  countries. 14 The U.S. 
experience  shows  that bilateral dealings  with China are very difficult, 
but if China were a member of the WTO, any departure from fair trade 
practices could be taken up in a multilateral forum. This would not only 
give  all countries,  including the less developed  countries of East Asia, 
a recourse in their trade disputes with China, but it would also increase 
the  possibility  of  satisfactory  settlements.  More  important,  China's 
membership  in  the  WTO  would  help  its  central  government  to  deal 
more effectively  with protectionist  pressures arising from the various 
provinces.  It would  also  help  it to restrain and control  any invisible 
trade barriers and other import restrictions  that individual  provinces 
might impose.  Without multilateral external pressure, the central gov- 
ernment might not be able to liberalize  its trade regime because it is so 
difficult to reconcile  the interests of different provinces. 
Second,  the United States should assume a greater leadership role in 
APEC.  At present,  APEC is the only  multilateral economic  forum in 
which  the United  States and China communicate  with each other.  By 
taking the lead,  the United States would be better able to assure China 
that it has no intention of pursuing a policy  of containment,  as it could 
more  effectively  help  China  to  pursue  economic  development  and 
would be aided in its efforts by the other APEC countries.  The United 
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States could also coordinate its policy  toward China through APEC by 
means of informal discussions  with the East Asian member countries. 
Third, the United States must establish a balance of economic  power 
in East Asia.  Specifically,  it must reduce the dependence  of the Asian 
NIEs,  the  members  of  ASEAN,  and the less  developed  countries  of 
East Asia on China,  and it must build more effective  leverage  against 
that country.  One possible  means  to this end is  to expand  the North 
American Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA).  Informal discussions  be- 
tween  the United  States and the East Asian  countries  about how they 
might qualify for membership,  not to mention their actual accession  to 
the agreement,  would  be  sufficient  to pressure China into improving 
trade relations with its neighbors. 
Fourth,  as  Cambodia,  Laos,  and  Myanmar  will  soon  be  joining 
ASEAN,  the United States should encourage the present member states 
to bring forward their membership and remove  as many trade restric- 
tions as possible within the association.  The United States could provide 
incentives  by engaging  the ASEAN  states in serious discussion  about 
facilitating  trade  in  other  directions,  including  with  the  parties  to 
NAFTA  and to the Australia-New  Zealand Closer Economic  and Trade 
Relations  agreement.  An enlarged and more influential Association  of 
South East Asian  Nations  would  offer  its member countries  more le- 
verage in dealing with China. It would also allow them to follow  viable 
development  strategies  and thus establish  closer  trade relations  with 
countries outside  Asia. 
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